The purchase discount is the engine of this strategy and the exit assumption is where it usually fails
The usual framing is that the deep discount at purchase is the engine and the resale is where the cash arrives. Look at the failures in this strategy and almost all of them sit on the second half of that sentence. Operators get the discount right. They buy at 68 percent of ARV and they are disciplined about it. Then the exit takes eleven months instead of four, or the ARV was underwritten on comps from a market that has since softened, and the entire built-in equity gets consumed by carry and a price cut. The durable version of this strategy depends on what actually protects the exit, so that is the question for the room. Does the protection come from holding as a rental when the sale stalls, from a wider discount at purchase, from a tighter rehab scope, or from something else entirely? Or is the honest reading that in a market with softening buyer demand the flip exit is structurally worse than it was, and the rental exit is the one that has to carry the strategy?