Why one mobile home park fund models a $250 reserve per lot and another models $600

Comparing two LP offerings acquiring small parks across the same three states can turn up assumptions far enough apart that one of them has to be wrong. Fund A models a 5 year hold, a 250 dollar per lot per year capex reserve, lot rents pushed from 275 to 400 over three years on the theory they sit 30% below market, water and sewer at 100% pass-through by year two, and an exit at a 6.0 cap on year five NOI. Fund B models a 7 year hold, a 600 dollar per lot per year reserve, 4% annual lot rent increases, water pass-through at 85% recovery to allow for line loss, and an exit at 6.75. Fund A's below-market claim resting on three comps within 40 miles is worth real scrutiny, especially if two of those comps are institutionally owned communities with paved roads and a clubhouse while the subject parks run on gravel and private lagoons. That gap often reflects a quality difference rather than a pricing gap, and a 45% rent increase over three years in a small town tends to invite exactly the regulatory and press attention the sector already draws. Testing a below-market lot rent claim is genuinely hard when the only true comps are other mom-and-pop parks with no public rent roll; the more reliable approach is calling those owners directly rather than relying on a broker's opinion of value. A defensible reserve per lot on private lagoon and well systems has to price in the tail risk that a single permit or environmental decision can turn into a six figure event, which is closer to Fund B's 600 dollar assumption than Fund A's 250.