The city rezoned mid-construction and the sponsor passed the cost to the LP stack through a capital call
A deal worth studying: a 14-story office conversion in a secondary Midwest market, 160 units targeted, acquisition basis at $28 per square foot. The sponsor structured it as a preferred equity position for LPs at 10 percent preferred, with a promote kicking in at a 1.4x equity multiple. Nine months into demolition, the city amended its residential overlay to require a minimum unit size that pushed the count from 160 to 131 units. Hard costs were already committed. The sponsor issued a capital call framed as a "scope adjustment," and LP documents gave them that right because the operating agreement defined material change as anything affecting more than 20 percent of projected revenue, and 29 units at the projected rent came in at 18 percent. One line in one definition and the call was legal. The preferred return clock kept running during the call period, which softened it slightly, but LPs who could not fund were diluted at a punitive rate that effectively wiped the promote participation on their original check. The number doing the most work in that deal was not the basis, not the preferred rate, it was the definition of "material change" and the dilution ratio attached to a missed capital call, and neither of those appears in the summary deck. What does your fund's operating agreement set as the threshold for a capital call that LPs cannot block, and what is the dilution mechanics for a non-funding LP?