Water and sewer on city hookups closed a 52-lot park deal that two other buyers walked away from.
The two buyers who passed were underwriting the private well and septic as a capital risk, which it was, at somewhere between $180k and $240k to connect to municipal systems based on the county's extension fee schedule at the time. What they did not price was the lot rent ceiling the private systems imposed. The park sat at $310 per lot in a market where comparable parks on city utilities were running $420 to $450, and that $110 to $140 gap was not seller stubbornness or tenant resistance, it was the actual cost of occupying a lot where the resident absorbs the uncertainty of well quality and septic failure. Once the infrastructure converted, the rent conversation changed entirely because the objection changed. Tenants on private systems are not just paying for a lot, they are absorbing infrastructure risk the owner should own. The ask to move toward market rent after conversion had almost no friction compared to what the pro formas assumed. The deals that walked priced the connection cost correctly and the rent trajectory wrong, which is the more expensive mistake because it flows through every year of the hold. The number doing too much work in both rejected underwriting packages was the stabilized cap rate applied to a rent that could not reach stabilized without the capital event first.
What was the gap between the connection bid you got and what the county's published extension fee schedule actually said?