Underwriting a saturated short-term rental market with real comps against an emerging one with real guesswork
A useful comparison for short-term rental underwriting: two files that fail in opposite directions. File A is a mature mountain market with three years of comp data, over 40 close comps, ADR in the low $200s, occupancy around 52 percent trailing twelve months, and a gross revenue projection near $58k on a $520k purchase that would hold up under scrutiny. The catch is that listings in that submarket are up about 38 percent year over year, and operators on the ground report shoulder season pricing softening. High confidence in the number, lower confidence in the number holding. File B is a small river town two hours from a metro, with roughly 40 active listings total, a new state park expansion, and one boutique hotel that opened last year. ADR looks like $150 to $170, but occupancy is close to a guess given the tiny sample size, and much of the existing inventory is informal. Purchase price is $268k, with no short-term rental ordinance yet in place, which cuts both ways: an early professional operation could capture outsized demand, or the demand simply may not materialize for years. The underlying tension is defensibility versus compression risk. A defensible number in a compressing market against an indefensible number in a market that may not compress for years. Some operators only underwrite where demand is provable; others point out that provable demand is exactly what everyone else has already bought into, which is part of why it's compressing. Which file merits further underwriting usually comes down to the buyer's tolerance for thin data versus their tolerance for buying into a market already showing rate pressure.
Where do you put the next dollar in short-term rentals?
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