How much contingency belongs on a conversion before it is simply a construction bet?
Take a 300,000 gsf 1970s office tower being marketed for conversion, with a sponsor deck that reads roughly like this. Acquisition at $60 per gsf, so $18M. Hard costs at $230 per gsf, so $69M. Soft costs at 18 percent of hard. Total near $100M before closing costs. The deck shows 65 percent efficiency, so 195,000 net rentable, 240 units averaging 810 sf. That is about $416k per unit all in. At a 5.25 exit cap that needs roughly $21,800 of NOI per unit, call it $2,900 gross monthly, which is $3.58 per net sf. That is an aggressive rent for the kind of submarket these towers usually sit in, though the best building on the block can sometimes get it. The problem is the contingency. A sponsor like this carries 5 percent on hard costs and nothing on soft. On a conversion of a building nobody has opened up yet, 5 percent reads like a typo. A careful underwriter would want 12 to 15, but at 15 percent a deal like this does not clear a normal hurdle at all, which says either the contingency assumption is wrong or the deal is. What are people actually carrying on conversions, and which line items are the ones that blow through it?