An REO fund that assumes courthouse steps supply will translate into acquisitions usually finds it does not
Here is a fund pattern worth working through, because it catches a lot of first time LPs. Eighteen months in, an REO fund has deployed maybe 35 percent of committed capital. The thesis looked solid on paper: filings were up and servicers were overwhelmed, so pricing would soften. What nobody modeled was how long the servicer pipeline actually sits before anything reaches disposition. Say the operator works the Southeast, two markets in Georgia and one in Tennessee, and the banks are holding paper for 14, sometimes 18 months before listing anything. By the time an asset hits the REO stage, every retail flipper in the county has driven by it six times. The spread underwritten at acquisition assumed the fund was buying distress. It was mostly buying a slightly discounted retail market with worse inspection rights. When the LP finally gets the sourcing breakdown, more than 70 percent of closed deals came from three MLS listed assets. That is shopping with extra steps and it is a long way from a distressed pipeline. A fund like that is not a disaster. It might return somewhere around 9 percent net against an expectation closer to 14. The assumption that does the damage is treating filing volume as a leading indicator of acquirable inventory. Filing volume is a leading indicator of eventual supply, and everything in between is someone else's negotiation with a servicer the fund has no access to. How would the room have caught that in the diligence phase?