My first capital commitment to an REO fund assumed courthouse steps supply would translate into acquisitions, and it did not
Eighteen months in, we had deployed maybe 35 percent of committed capital. The thesis was solid on paper: filings up, servicers overwhelmed, pricing would soften. What nobody modeled was how long the servicer pipeline actually sits before anything reaches disposition. Our operator was in the Southeast, two markets in Georgia and one in Tennessee, and the banks were holding paper for 14, sometimes 18 months before listing anything. By the time an asset hit the REO stage, every retail flipper in the county had already driven by it six times. The spread we underwrote at acquisition assumed we were buying distress. We were mostly buying a slightly discounted retail market with worse inspection rights. I kept asking the operator for the sourcing breakdown, and the numbers showed more than 70 percent of closed deals came from three MLS-listed assets. That is not a distressed pipeline, that is just shopping with extra steps. The fund is not a disaster, I am going to get out somewhere around a 9 percent net, but I went in expecting something closer to 14. The assumption that did the damage was treating filing volume as a leading indicator of acquirable inventory. It is not. It is a leading indicator of eventual supply, and everything in between is someone else's negotiation with a servicer you have no access to.