The exit discount clause in a land banking operating agreement can end up being the whole return
Take a case of two partners buying 40 acres of dryland at the exurban edge in 2019, $5,200 an acre, $208,000, split 50/50 through an LLC. No income, taxes around $1,900 a year at the time, split evenly. The thesis was a slow one, a metro pushing outward along a state highway, a twelve to fifteen year horizon. Four years in, one partner needs out for personal reasons unrelated to the deal, and the land is the asset with no lender and no tenants, so it becomes the easiest thing to point at. That forces a first real read of the operating agreement since signing. What the agreement said, credit to the attorney who drafted it rather than the partners: any member wanting out triggers a right of first refusal to the other member at a price set by an appraisal of the whole parcel, with the exiting member's share valued at their percentage of that number, less an agreed twenty percent adjustment for lack of marketability and lack of control. That adjustment, written in at signing when nobody was thinking about it, ends up being the single most important sentence in the deal. Say the appraisal comes in at $7,900 an acre, $316,000 for the whole parcel. The exiting partner's half is $158,000, and less the twenty percent adjustment, $126,400. A negotiated settlement close to that number, say $132,000, is a realistic outcome when the remaining partner wants the matter closed cleanly. The remaining partner in a case like this ends up owning 40 acres with a blended basis well under the appraised value, but the carry doubles overnight on a single set of shoulders. That is the part underwriting often misses: the original plan was to carry half of a long hold, and the buyout leaves someone carrying all of a long hold, with eight or more years still to run and no income. Funding that buyout from a line of credit rather than reserves is a common but risky path, and paying it back quickly and building a dedicated tax reserve for several years out is the disciplined fix, because the real failure mode in land banking is being forced to sell mid thesis. What nearly breaks a structure like this is the built in right to challenge with a competing appraisal, averaging the two if they land within ten percent. A second appraisal even modestly higher can move the exiting partner's number meaningfully and push the gap past that ten percent band, forcing a third appraiser with no real ceiling in sight. Whether that risk materializes often comes down to whether the exiting partner chooses to exercise that right. The broader lesson: a clear valuation mechanism written into the agreement before anyone needs it is what makes an exit like this survivable, and anyone drafting one should have their own attorney review how a marketability adjustment would actually hold up if it were ever disputed.