The cap rate on a storage acquisition tells you almost nothing if you do not know how the seller measured occupancy.
Economic occupancy and physical occupancy are two different numbers, and some sellers report whichever one is higher. A facility running at 88 percent physical but collecting on 79 percent of its units because of delinquencies, concessions, and units held for auction is not an 88 percent occupied asset. The NOI you are buying is the one built on collections, and if the offering memo used physical occupancy to construct trailing revenue, the going-in cap rate you are underwriting is overstated before you run a single scenario. In a portfolio acquisition where that gap exists across eight or ten facilities, the aggregate misstatement can move your effective purchase price by enough to flip the deal's IRR from acceptable to marginal.
The second place this bites is the stabilization assumption in a value-add story. A seller who describes a facility as 82 percent occupied when the rent roll shows 14 percent of tenants more than 60 days past and heading toward lien sale has not given you an 82 percent occupied asset to grow. They have given you a collections problem dressed as upside. The spread between where they say the facility is and where it actually performs sets a false floor on your pro forma, and the lease-up timeline you model from that floor is wrong from the first month.
The cleaner ask in any due diligence is a 13-month rent roll with payment status, not just a current occupancy snapshot. That run shows you seasonal patterns, the delinquency rate by unit type, and whether any large-unit tenants are propping up a number that will not hold post-close. On a portfolio deal, I would want that data cut at the facility level before the aggregate underwriting means anything.
What does the rent roll you are looking at show for units more than 45 days past due as a share of total occupied units?