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My lawyer said something to me on Tuesday that I keep turning over: "You're pricing the exit before you've priced the cost of being wrong.

We were going through a deal structure where the borrower was doing BRRRR, first one, and the whole thing assumed the refinance would come in at 75% LTV on an ARV of $290k in a mid-sized Ohio city, Akron specifically. The buy was $140k, rehab budget $55k, so all-in $195k. On paper the refinance pulls out $217k and everybody goes home clean. But we were sitting there asking what happens if the appraiser comes in at $255k instead of $290k. That is a real possibility in that market right now, not a catastrophic one, a realistic one. Suddenly $35k stays in the deal, the borrower is short on their next acquisition, and they are calling us asking for patience on the next tranche.

The thing I had not thought about hard enough before Tuesday is that BRRRR, on the borrowing side, is a single-point-of-failure model until you have done it enough times that you have capital to absorb the gap. The whole sequence depends on the appraisal landing within a range that the borrower modeled months earlier, before rates moved, before materials came in high, before the tenant took six weeks to place. Any one of those slips and the recycled capital does not fully recycle.

I am not saying do not do it. I am saying price what being wrong by $30k actually costs you before you commit to the repeat part of the strategy.

2 replies

Akron comp volatility is real right now, saw a deal there last year where the appraiser pulled from Canton because there wasn't enough clean inventory in the immediate neighborhood, knocked $22k off what the numbers needed. That's not a bad appraisal, that's just how thin the comp pool gets in some of those zip codes.

The part I'd push on is the rehab budget side, not the ARV side. $55k in that market has crept in the last 18 months and if the borrower is using a GC they haven't used before, that number is the first place the deal quietly bleeds before you even get to the appraisal conversation.

The assumption doing the most work in that deal is not the ARV estimate itself. It is the implicit assumption that the ARV estimate and the rehab cost estimate are independent variables. They are not. The conditions that push an appraisal from $290k to $255k in Akron right now, softening comps, rising cap rate expectations, thin buyer pool at that price tier, are often the same conditions that made materials and contractor time run over budget in the first place. So the $35k appraisal gap and the $10k rehab overrun tend to arrive together, not separately. The borrower who modeled a $30k error is often sitting on a $45k one.

The structural point you are naming is right. BRRRR is a sequential model with a single liquidity event, and until an operator has a capital reserve that functions as a buffer, each deal in the chain is load-bearing for the next one. The refinance is not just a financing mechanism; it is the working capital account for the next acquisition. Treating a probability-weighted appraisal shortfall as an acceptable variance misses that it is also a timing problem. Capital trapped in deal one does not just reduce deal two's down payment. It can delay deal two past a purchase contract deadline or past a rate lock window.

One thing worth running explicitly: what does the deal look like if the refinance comes in at 70% LTV instead of 75%, using the lower appraised value? That second-order calculation, lower percentage applied to lower base, is where the real gap lives, and most first-deal underwriting stops one layer short of it.

A licensed attorney and a qualified CPA should be in the room on structure and tax treatment. You are already there on the former.

What does the borrower's reserve position actually look like if $40k stays trapped? Is there a stated liquidity floor in the deal docs, or is that gap currently unaddressed?

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