The assumption doing the most work in your framework is the ARV. At 75% LTV on a DSCR refi, the appraised value controls almost everything: how much capital comes back, whether the debt service is serviceable at 1.25x, and whether the sponsor traps equity or recycles it. Sponsors who model from purchase price forward tend to anchor their ARV to the comp that justifies the deal rather than the comp a conservative appraiser would use. You're running the math against a number that hasn't been stress-tested yet.
The risk I'd add to your framework is appraisal gap timing. In Snohomish specifically, comp velocity can shift between the day the sponsor runs their model and the day the DSCR lender orders the appraisal, sometimes 90 to 120 days later after rehab. A refinance underwritten at 75% of a stale ARV can still blow up if the appraiser pulls comps from a softer quarter. The sponsor's conservative ARV estimate needs to account for that lag, not just market conditions on the day they underwrote.
The other thing worth noting: DSCR thresholds vary by lender and loan structure, and the 1.25 floor you're using may not match what the refinance lender applies. Confirm with the DSCR lender in writing what their actual coverage requirement is for the property type and loan size in question, because a mismatch there creates a second point of failure after the ARV risk.
Your backward-from-refi approach is structurally sound. Most of the BRRRR failures I see documented follow exactly the pattern you're describing, forward-modeled deals where the refinance was never stress-tested as a standalone underwrite.
When you're reviewing these, are sponsors typically bringing their own DSCR lender term sheet, or are they modeling against a rate and coverage assumption they haven't confirmed?