The industrial shell that priced at a 6.1 yield on cost and exited at a 7.4 cap still returned capital, but the sponsor's promote did not survive the math.
The deal: a 48,000 sf single-tenant industrial shell, all-in development cost of $4.2 million, stabilized NOI of $256,200, so yield on cost sat at 6.1 percent. The underwrite assumed a 6.5 exit cap, which put value at $3.94 million and barely covered cost. The team leaned on lease-up speed and a rent bump at year two to close the gap, so the model needed both to work at the same time. The tenant signed, the rent bump held, NOI climbed to $294,000, and the exit cap the market gave them was 7.4. Value at sale came to $3.97 million, essentially what it cost to build. LP capital returned whole, preferred return paid, promote wiped out because there was nothing above the pref to split. The sponsor worked the deal for three years and walked with the development fee they took at construction close, which had been $160,000. That is the number that actually paid them.
The assumption doing the most work in a spread that thin is the exit cap, and in this case the spread between yield on cost and exit cap compressed from 55 basis points to negative 130. The model held a single scenario and called the rent bump a conservative projection. It was not conservative, it was necessary. When an underwrite needs two things to go right to avoid a loss and treats both as base case, that is one scenario dressed as a range.
The question I keep turning over: at a 55 basis point spread between yield on cost and exit cap in the base case, what does the promote structure actually need to look like for the sponsor to have real upside without asking the LP to take on more risk than the numbers justify?