I have to defend a 60% leisure resort allocation I did not choose

Stress test it at the P&L, not at the strategy deck. Take one representative resort underwriting and one representative extended-stay underwriting and run the same shock through both: RevPAR down 15% for eight quarters, then flat.

What you'll see is that the resort loses more NOI per dollar of RevPAR decline. Resorts carry more fixed labor, more amenity departments that run at a loss when occupancy drops, and food and beverage revenue that falls faster than rooms. Flow-through works in both directions, so a resort at 4.5x fixed cost coverage in a strong year can be at breakeven after debt service in a soft one. Extended-stay runs thinner staffing per occupied room and its guest is often on a project or a relocation, which is spending that doesn't stop the same month a household cancels a vacation. That's the mechanical version of your concern, and it's a stronger argument than the discretionary-spending point on its own.

The resort thesis you should credit: rate is stickier at the top than most people expect, supply is genuinely constrained in the good destinations because entitlement is hard on coastlines and in resort towns, and there is no new competing product arriving in three years. A well-located resort with a real barrier around it can hold rate through a soft cycle by trading occupancy. That's a real edge, and it's location-specific rather than segment-specific. So push them on which destinations, what the entitlement picture is, and how much of the projected NOI comes from food and beverage and other ancillary lines versus rooms.

Separately, the fee on committed capital plus a full catch-up means the GP is paid on pace of deployment. In a sector where the right answer some years is to wait, ask what happens to fees during a slow deployment year, and whether the pref compounds. Have counsel read the actual LPA language.