Where a hotel sponsor's flow-through assumption tends to hide the real risk in a PIP conversion deal
Consider a co-invest structure on an upper-midscale hotel, 118 keys in a secondary market with a decent interstate and a hospital nearby. Purchase at 14.2 million, roughly 120k a key, plus a PIP and brand conversion at 3.1 million, about 26k a key, bringing all-in to around 147k a key before closing costs. Today's numbers: occupancy 64%, ADR 122, RevPAR 78, trailing twelve NOI 1.41 million on 4.9 million total revenue, roughly a 29% margin and a 9.9% yield on purchase price before capex. The pro forma for year three assumes occupancy 70%, ADR 146, RevPAR 102, reaching those numbers through the conversion plus a claimed 68% flow-through on incremental revenue, landing NOI at 2.36 million, with an exit modeled at an 8.0 cap on year four NOI. Management runs 3% of gross revenue base plus 10% incentive over a 9% return on invested capital, with FF&E reserve at 4% of gross revenue starting year two. The part worth stress testing hardest is that 68% flow-through on a 31% ADR increase. That assumption tends to imply labor stays close to flat while rate climbs, and few operating businesses actually behave that way. Renovation displacement is also frequently missing from these models entirely, and a full conversion across 118 keys is rarely a quiet quarter for occupancy. The incentive threshold set at a 9% return means the operator earns nothing extra until the deal is already performing, which aligns incentives reasonably well, though it is worth thinking through which direction that pushes reporting and timing decisions near that threshold. Anyone underwriting a deal like this on a tight funding window should run the pro forma at a materially lower flow-through, model at least one full quarter of displacement, and pressure test what NOI looks like if stabilization slips a year.