$118k a door on a 1985 value-add, or $198k on a 2023 lease-up. Wrong axis?
Two things on my list this week and they're the same equity check.
Deal A. 176 units, 1985 vintage, garden style, in an inner-ring suburb of a midwest metro. $118k a door. Rents about $310 under the renovated comps in a two mile ring. Sponsor plan is $22k a unit inside plus roughly $1.8m of exterior and systems, which is roof, parking lot, two boilers and a full electrical panel replacement on eight buildings. Occupancy 91, delinquency 4 percent, so there's a resident quality story too. In-place cap 5.8, stabilized cap on cost 6.9.
Deal B. 288 units, delivered 2023, currently 74 percent leased with two months free on new leases. Merchant builder's construction loan is maturing. $198k a door, and the builder's all-in cost was about $254k. So I'm buying 22 percent under cost with zero renovation risk and a brand new asset. In-place cap on the current concession-burdened income is 4.1. Untrended stabilized, meaning today's asking rents with the concessions gone and 93 percent occupancy, gets to 5.5.
Deal A has more spread and I know how to do that work. Deal B has no construction risk, no roof, no scope creep, and a basis that a replacement-cost buyer would look at in three years and consider cheap. What Deal B has instead is that I'm underwriting the concession burn-off, and every month it doesn't burn off is a month of negative leverage on a 4.1 in-place.
The thing I can't get past is that Deal A's $310 rent gap is measured against renovated comps in a submarket where a 2023 building down the road is giving away eight weeks. If the new stuff is discounting, my renovated 1985 unit competes with a new unit at close to the same effective rent, and my $310 gap is really $150.
I have to give an answer on A by Friday because there's another bidder. B has no deadline, which is itself information.