The assumption doing the most work in your renovation underwrite was borrower default, which you cannot price in. That is the structural tension in note-to-ownership plays: the yield on the paper works, but the conversion rate to REO is never in your control, and a borrower with enough liquidity to reinstate nine days out was always a reinstatement risk, not a foreclosure candidate.
The $31,400 net on a five-month hold is a clean return on the note itself, so the instrument worked. The frustration is strategic, not financial. You built an operating thesis around an asset you did not yet control, which is worth examining. At 63 cents, your basis was low enough that you had real margin, but the renovation underwrite, specifically the $68k to lift rents by $230 per door across seven units, was priced on an ownership assumption. That is a different transaction than the one you actually closed.
A few things to look at on the two NOD files in the pipeline. Reinstatement risk correlates with borrower equity position and borrower sophistication. If either of those owners is equity-rich relative to the note balance, they have more paths to cure than a genuinely distressed borrower does. The closer the note discount gets to their actual equity cushion, the less motivated they are to let it go to sale. Your caller should be able to give you a read on the borrower's current situation and whether there is a deed-in-lieu conversation worth having before the sale date, since that shortens your timeline and removes the reinstatement window entirely. Talk to your attorney on the mechanics before pursuing that path, since the right of reinstatement and DIL negotiations sit at the edge of what you want to handle without counsel.
What is the loan-to-value picture on the two active files relative to where you are buying the note?