REIT rules name mortgages and stay silent on mezzanine, does that silence actually reach the price
A fund pitch built around REIT caution on mezzanine debt is worth pressure testing. The argument usually runs that REIT qualification rules explicitly permit interests in mortgages and stay silent on mezzanine loans, that ambiguity keeps a chunk of public capital on the sidelines, and therefore the spread on mezz is wider than the risk deserves. Anything involving REIT qualification is a question for tax counsel, not something to treat as settled from a deck. The more interesting question is the second half of the claim. Suppose the caution is real and durable. Does the absence of that buyer actually widen mezz pricing, or has debt fund and private credit capital already filled the hole so completely that the observed spread is just what the risk earns on its own. The case for it reaching the price: fewer eligible balance sheets means fewer bidders per deal, and in a market generating steady gap demand from a maturity wall, thin bidder counts should show up in coupon and structure, most visibly on smaller tranches where the bid list is short anyway. The case against: mezz has targeted roughly 10 to 15 percent through very different capital conditions, which suggests the return is set by where subordinate risk clears rather than by which category of holder shows up, and private credit has plenty of capital with no such ambiguity, so the marginal bidder is present either way. Both patterns show up in quotes and are hard to separate from deal quality alone. What evidence would actually settle this is worth working through.
Does REIT caution on mezz ownership actually widen mezz pricing?
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