Reading a preferred prospectus is not the same as pricing off the right yield
Take a fixed-to-floating preferred from a mortgage REIT, bought at $26.30 against a $25 par. Fixed coupon 7.75 percent on par, so $1.9375 a year, $0.4844 a quarter. The reasoning that draws people in is that the fixed period has a couple of years left and the float reset afterward looks attractive relative to where short rates are expected to sit. Then the issuer calls it at par nine months in, on the first call date, which was disclosed in the document all along. Run the numbers on 1,200 shares: $31,560 in, $30,000 back, plus three quarterly payments of $581 each, $1,744. Net $184 on $31,560 across nine months. That is roughly a 0.8 percent annualized return on capital priced for something yielding near 7.4 percent at cost. The premium paid above par evaporates on a date the issuer gets to pick. The mistake at the document level is common: read the call provision, understand it, then price the position off current yield anyway. Current yield at $26.30 was about 7.4 percent. Yield to call, using the first call date and a $25 redemption, was somewhere near 1 percent. Those are the same security. The bigger number gets the attention because it's the one printed on the screen. The second miss is holding a view on where short rates will go with no view on where the issuer's cost of new preferred capital will go. Those are the same question from opposite sides. If the reset favors the holder, it's expensive for the issuer, and the issuer holds the right to make it stop. The fix: price any preferred trading above par off yield to call and treat current yield as marketing. Read the call schedule as a statement about who owns the optionality, because it is rarely the buyer.