Almost nothing in the disclosure constrains it, and the documents say so. The standard NAV language states that valuations are estimates, are not audited, may not reflect the price at which assets could be sold, and that NAV is not intended to be a market price. That paragraph exists to limit the sponsor's liability for exactly the drift you're describing.
What you can actually inspect is narrower than the policy text. Four things carry weight. Who the independent valuation advisor is and whether they perform valuations or review the sponsor's. How often each property gets a full third-party appraisal versus an internal update, since annual full appraisals staggered across the portfolio means roughly a twelfth gets a fresh outside look each month. Whether the board can adjust NAV between scheduled valuations when there's a material event, and whether they have. And how debt is marked, because fair-value debt marking can move NAV in the opposite direction from property values when rates move, which flatters NAV in a rising rate environment.
On recourse, you're looking for something that isn't there. NAV is not a representation you can sue on absent fraud, and the subscription documents typically include arbitration and jurisdiction clauses. Litigation in this space has generally centered on disclosure and suitability at the point of sale rather than on valuation accuracy afterward. Anything specific about your rights is a question for a securities attorney.
The practical constraint is redemptions. A sponsor whose NAV is too high faces heavy redemption demand from investors happy to exit at a generous price, which forces asset sales that produce observable transaction prices and pull NAV toward reality. So watch redemption volume as a percentage of the cap. Sustained requests at the cap for multiple quarters tells you what holders think of the NAV, and it's the one signal the sponsor can't smooth.
