A case study in a syndication where the fee stack quietly ate the return the promote was supposed to reward
Worth studying as a cautionary case: an LP closes out a $55k investment at 1.03x over four years, in a deal where the underlying property actually performed reasonably well, which makes the outcome worth digging into. The deal: a portfolio of small rural multifamily, five properties, 138 units total, low price points. A 7 percent pref paid current for eleven of sixteen quarters, NOI growth of about 19 percent over the hold, and a sale at a slightly better cap than the purchase. On paper, a decent deal. The gap shows up in the fee stack once it is totaled. A 2 percent acquisition fee on purchase price, a 2 percent asset management fee on gross revenue rather than on equity (a very different number on a rural portfolio with high gross revenue relative to value), a 5 percent construction management fee on all capex on a deal with heavy capex spend, a 1 percent disposition fee, and a flat annual administrative charge across the fund. Add it up and the sponsor's total fee take across the hold can run close to the entire LP profit distribution pool, even when the promote itself stays small because the return was mediocre. Every one of those fees is typically disclosed individually. The step that gets skipped is totaling them and expressing the sum as a percentage of projected LP profit, which is what would reveal a base case landing near break-even after inflation. The practical fix: model the fee stack as a line item before subscribing, and specifically model asset management fees against the actual base they are charged on, since percent of gross revenue and percent of invested equity are not comparable numbers and treating them as interchangeable is where LPs get caught.