I priced the gap to replacement cost as protection, and I'm no longer sure that's honest
I came from the build side, so replacement cost is the number I trust most and I think that's exactly the bias I need beaten out of me.
Deal shape: 312 units, 2004 vintage, garden, second ring suburban submarket with employment inside four miles. In contract around $181k a door. My own cost stack to put the same thing up today runs $258k all in, and that's with land I'd have to fight for. Hard costs alone are up close to 39 percent from 2020 on my own historical bids, so the gap isn't imaginary.
In my model that gap does two jobs. First it caps competitive supply, because nobody underwrites a new start at a 4.9 untrended yield on cost when the resale comp is $181k. Second it gives me an exit story, since a buyer in 2029 is comparing me to whatever it costs to build then.
The problem is that job one is a forecast dressed as a fact. Hard costs are not a floor. If labor loosens and materials come off 8 to 10 percent while land sellers finally capitulate, my $258k becomes $232k and the moat narrows without my rents moving at all. And job two only pays if the next buyer weights the cost approach, which nobody does on stabilized apartments.
So I want to know how the people underwriting this for a living treat it. Is the replacement cost gap a line you can actually price, in years of supply protection or in basis points of exit cap, or is it a sentence in the investment committee memo that makes a thin deal feel thicker?
In institutional apartment underwriting, what work does buying below replacement cost actually do?
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