Steel and sitework overran 19 percent, so distributions stopped for six quarters
Take a 200,000 dollar commitment made in 2022 to a storage fund pitched as 70 percent stabilized acquisitions and 30 percent ground-up development. The stabilized side performs about as advertised, unremarkable and roughly in line with the deck. The development sleeve is where the case study gets interesting. Three climate-controlled builds: one suburban infill and two secondary-market pads. Budget at close ran 11.4 million dollars all in across the three, hard costs underwritten around 58 dollars a foot with a 5 percent contingency. The steel package got ordered late on two of the three, sitework on the infill pad turned up bad soil, and the final number landed near 69 dollars a foot, a 19 percent overrun on hard costs that burned through the contingency by the second draw. The GP issued a capital call for 11 percent of committed capital, and limited partners who declined generally faced dilution at a punishing rate under the LPA. Then lease-up. Underwriting assumed 3.5 percent of net rentable filling per month toward a 90 percent stabilized figure. Two of the three properties ran closer to 2.1 percent, filling at street rates well under pro forma because relocations in those markets largely stopped. The interest reserve ran dry eleven months into a lease-up that was supposed to take twenty, and distributions from the whole fund paused to feed the development assets, meaning income from the stabilized side effectively funded the shortfall on the development slabs. Six quarters passed with no cash to limited partners. Marked value sat roughly flat to basis on the GP's own mark, a figure worth treating skeptically given the incentive to smooth it. The diligence points worth carrying forward: confirm whether a GMP contract is actually signed on each development asset before committing capital, not whether one is merely expected. Read the cross-funding language closely for any provision that lets stabilized cash cover development shortfalls. And cap exposure to a fund's development sleeve at the fund level rather than accepting the blended allocation as given.