Steel and sitework overran 19%, so distributions stopped for six quarters
I committed $200k in 2022 to a storage fund that pitched itself as 70% stabilized acquisitions, 30% ground-up. The stabilized side has been fine, boring, roughly what the deck said. The development sleeve is what ate me.
Three climate-controlled builds, one suburban infill and two secondary-market pads. Budget at close was $11.4M all in across the three, hard costs underwritten at about $58 a foot with a 5% contingency. Steel package got ordered late on two of the three, sitework on the infill pad found bad soil, and the final number landed near $69 a foot. That's 19% over on hard costs and the contingency was gone by the second draw. The GP issued a capital call for 11% of committed. I funded it because the alternative in the LPA was dilution at a punishing rate.
Then lease-up. Underwriting had 3.5% of net rentable filling per month to a 90% stabilized figure. Two of the three are running closer to 2.1%, and the street rate they're filling at is under the pro forma by a double-digit percentage because relocations in those markets basically stopped. Interest reserve ran dry eleven months into a lease-up that was supposed to take twenty. Distributions from the whole fund got paused to feed the development assets, so my stabilized side income is funding somebody else's slab.
Six quarters with no cash. Marked value is roughly flat to my basis if you believe the GP's mark, and I don't especially.
What I'd do differently: I'd have asked whether a GMP contract was actually signed on each development asset before I funded, not whether one was "expected." I'd have read the cross-funding language that lets stabilized cash go to development shortfalls. And I'd have capped my exposure to the development sleeve at the fund level instead of taking the blended allocation as given.