Case study: a tax lien fund that charged fees on committed capital it never deployed
A structural pitfall worth understanding in tax lien fund investing is the difference between fees charged on committed capital versus invested capital, and how disciplined bidding can still leave a limited partner with a weak outcome. Take a $250k commitment on a three year term with a 1.75% management fee charged on committed capital rather than invested capital. A disciplined manager who states a floor bid rate and refuses to bid below it, even as auction competition in their core jurisdictions pushes clearing rates under that floor for most of the first year, might end year one having deployed only 38% of committed capital, with the rest sitting in short treasuries earning very little. The fee, however, is charged on the full committed amount regardless of deployment, so at 1.75% on $250k that is $4,375 a year, or roughly $12,600 across a three year term on capital that averaged maybe 55% deployed. Net return to the investor in that scenario can land well below what an 8% target return would have suggested, even though the manager's bidding discipline was arguably the correct call given market conditions. The difficult part of this case is that the manager's discipline is hard to fault. Bidding through the floor to force deployment would likely have produced worse risk-adjusted outcomes. The real issue is that the fee structure paid the manager identically whether capital was deployed or not, so the incentive to solve the deployment problem sat entirely on the manager's professionalism rather than being built into the economics. What a prospective limited partner can reasonably ask for before committing: a fee calculated on invested capital, or a reduced rate on undeployed capital, and a written deployment pace by vintage year for every prior fund the manager has run. A manager unwilling to show historical deployment speed is usually signaling that the answer is slower than advertised.